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A B S T R A C T
This paper assesses the effects of a significant place-based intervention that targeted local businesses in deprived
areas in the UK. To gain identification, we use data at a fine spatial scale and a regression discontinuity design
exploiting the eligibility deprivation rank rule based on a pre-determined deprivation index. We detect no overall
effects on employment in treated areas but find a significant displacement of employment from nearby untreated
areas, corresponding to around 10% of local employment. The results suggest that indirect displacement effects
may substantially weaken the ability of local support programmes targeting the non-tradable sector to reduce
economic inequality.
1. Introduction
Many governments target significant amounts of public spending at
areas experiencing poor economic performance. In the US, around $95
billion is spent annually on spatially targeted economic development
programs by the federal and state governments (Kline and Moretti,
2014a), and place-based interventions account for around 35 percent of
total spending by the EU (EU, 2013). Despite the prevalence of
place-based policies, a common concern among economists is that they
may shift economic activity from one place to another. Such displace-
ment effects would reduce aggregate net benefits of these interventions.1
Moreover, because deprivation is often spatially clustered, the nearby
areas that may be negatively affected by displacement are often also
deprived. Therefore, local displacement effects might also limit the
extent to which these policies reduce economic inequality if they merely
shift economic activity between deprived areas.
In this study, we assess the impacts of a significant area-based inter-
vention that targeted local businesses in 30 economically deprived areas
in England. We start by estimating treatment effects in a standard
difference-in-difference framework, comparing treated areas to nearby
untreated areas and conditioning on area characteristics and fixed ef-
fects. In order to strengthen the internal validity of our results, we also
employ a regression discontinuity (RD) design based on a discontinuity in
treatment at the eligibility cutoff, which was determined by a pre-
determined index of local deprivation. Neither of these approaches de-
tects statistically significant treatment effects on employment, number of
local business, or unemployment in treated areas.2
Motivated by the fact that most programme support was targeted to
local businesses in the non-tradable sector (e.g. restaurants, hairdressers,
and retail stores), we continue by assessing the potential displacement of
☆ We thank seminar participants at Bologna, Science Po – LIEPP, Aix-Marseilles School of Economics, HECER, Swansea, CEP, ETLA, Jyv€askyl€a, SERC, VATT,
ESEM, CEPR CURE, CAGE International Research Day, and NARSC for helpful comments and suggestions. This work was supported by the Economic and Social
Research Council grant numbers ES/J021342/1 and ES/G005966/1. It contains statistical data from ONS which is Crown copyright and reproduced with the
permission of the controller of HMSO and Queen’s Printer for Scotland. The use of the ONS statistical data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in
relation to the interpretation or analysis of the statistical data. This work uses research datasets which may not exactly reproduce National Statistics aggregates.
* Corresponding author. VATT Institute for Economic Research, Arkadiankatu 7, 00101 Helsinki, Finland.
E-mail addresses: elias.einio@vatt.fi (E. Eini€o), h.g.overman@lse.ac.uk (H.G. Overman).
1 For a discussion of the efficiency of spatially-targeted economic interventions, see e.g. Greenstone and Looney (2010) and Kline and Moretti (2013, 2014a).
2 We show that pre-policy outcomes are balanced between treatment and control groups, there is no bunching at the RD threshold, and that our results are robust to
a battery of RD validity checks.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Regional Science and Urban Economics
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/regec
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2019.103500
Received 4 February 2019; Received in revised form 13 December 2019; Accepted 17 December 2019
Available online xxxx
0166-0462/© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Regional Science and Urban Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx
Please cite this article as: Eini€o, E., Overman, H.G., The effects of supporting local business: Evidence from the UK, Regional Science and Urban
Economics , https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2019.103500
economic activity from nearby unsupported areas to the treated areas by
examining changes in outcomes for 1-km-wide zones. Our test of
displacement uses untreated areas that are further from the treatment
boundary as a counterfactual for untreated and treated areas at the
boundary. This approach identifies displacement effects if indirect effects
on the untreated weaken sufficiently quickly as the distance between
them and treated locations increases. This condition is likely to hold in
the case of interventions that target local non-tradable markets, which
typically have limited spatial scope.
Using both the difference-in-difference and RD estimators, we detect
significant displacement of employment from unsupported to supported
areas. The results indicate that the spatial scope of displacement, and
hence the affected local market, is around 2 kmwide (1 km on either side
of the treatment area boundary). We estimate the magnitude of the local
displacement to be around 10% of local employment. While we cannot
completely rule out the possibility that control areas further away from
the boundary may also be affected by displacement, such effects would
bias our estimates downwards, and therefore our analysis provides a
lower bound for the displacement effect. We also show that the
displacement effects are persistent through the policy-on years and that
they disappear after the programme is abolished, suggesting that support
for local non-tradable sector is unlikely to have persistent effects on local
economies.
In contrast to the strong local displacement of employment, we find
weaker evidence of displacement in terms of number of businesses. This
finding is consistent with inelastic business premise supply in dense
areas, where little free land for new development is available. Finally, we
find no effects on unemployment, which is based on residential location.
This is consistent with the idea that local labor markets cross programme
boundaries and with previous evidence indicating that jobs generated by
area-based interventions are often taken by individuals who reside
outside the treatment area (e.g., Busso et al., 2013; Freedman, 2015).
Much of previous evidence on the displacement effects of place-based
policies concern local tax incentives. In this strand of research, studies
using causal research designs find mixed results. For example, Ham et al.
(2011) and Givord et al. (2013) find no evidence of employment
displacement. Hanson and Rohlin (2013) find evidence of displacement
of establishments and employment in unsupported nearby areas, while
Hanson and Rohlin (2011), Harger and Ross (2016), and Mayer et al.
(2017) provide evidence of industry churning and displacement of eco-
nomic activity within supported areas. Studies examining the impacts of
programmes promoting local investment and infrastructure have also
found mixed evidence of displacement. Criscuolo et al. (2019) estimate
the effects of a local investment subsidy programme in the UK targeting
the manufacturing sector. They find no evidence of indirect effects on
employment in nearby untreated areas. On the contrary, in their study on
temporary regional transfers targeting local investment in Germany,
Ehrlich and Seidel (2018) employ a spatial differencing strategy based on
distance to the boundary of the eligible zone and find evidence of
displacement of income and employment. Patrick (2016) shows that
increasing capital subsidy availability is associated with both
capital-labor substitution and changes in local industry mix.
We advance and complement research in this area in several ways.
First, we examine the impacts of a programme that targets subsidies
predominantly to the local non-tradable sector. Because local spillovers
are expected to be large in this sector, assessing local displacement effects
is especially relevant in the context of such programmes. Second, we
provide quasi-experimental evidence of significant displacement of
employment in programmes targeting the local non-tradable sector.3
Third, our research design combines spatial differencing at boundaries of
programme areas with an RD design based on pre-determined
programme eligibility rule that does not depend on location. This might
be important, because the spatial difference-in-difference strategy may
not completely account for the potential unobserved factors that may
discontinuously change when crossing administrative boundaries (e.g.,
Ham et al., 2011).
More generally, our study is linked to the literature examining the
effects of area-based interventions. Studies examining local tax and block
grant schemes with broad target scope in terms of sector and employee
type have found positive impacts on employment (e.g., Ham et al., 2011;
Busso et al., 2013).4 Studies examining the impacts of programmes
promoting local investment and infrastructure have found also positive
effects (e.g., Criscuolo et al., 2019; Kline and Moretti, 2014b; Ehrlich and
Seidel, 2018). Moreover, Kline and Moretti (2014b) and Ehrlich and
Seidel (2018) find that the effects of investment and infrastructure sup-
port can last long beyond the programme period. Freedman (2012) finds
modest positive impacts of investor tax incentives supporting investment
in low-income communities. Our study complements research in this area
by providing evidence of the impacts of a programme that provides
public funding mainly for local service businesses. Our finding of sub-
stantial displacement of employment in the short-run and no aggregate or
long-term effects combined with evidence of positive persistent impacts
found in studies examining schemes which have wider sectoral scope and
focus on investment highlights the importance of efficient targeting of
place-based policies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides more
details of the LEGI programme. Section 3 describes our data while section
4 describes our identification strategy and section 5 reports the results.
Section 6 concludes.
2. Institutional setting
The three key objectives of the Local Enterprise Growth Initiative
(LEGI), introduced by the British government in 2006, were to i) increase
entrepreneurial activity in deprived areas ii) support growth and reduce
exit rates among local businesses in deprived areas, and iii) attract in-
vestment into deprived areas (DCLG, 2010a). The primary aim of LEGI
funding was to increase resources and develop existing schemes sup-
porting these objectives (HM Treasury, 2006).
91 deprived Local Authorities (LA) in England were eligible to bid for
LEGI funding. These were areas that were receiving funds from an
existing programme – Neighborhood Renewal Fund (NRF) – at the time
LEGI was announced in July 2005, and any areas that were named
eligible for the 2006–2008 allocation of the NRF.5 In order to be eligible,
a Local Authority had to rank 50th or worst against any of eleven indices
of multiple deprivation (IMD) in 2000 or 2004. These indices were
constructed by the central government using a complex three step pro-
cedure based on variables pre-dating the introduction of LEGI, some of
which dated back as far as the 1991 Census (Appendix B provides details
of the construction of these indices).
Selection of treatment areas from the pool of eligible Local Author-
ities was based on proposals detailing the way in which they planned to
achieve the objectives of the initiative. To support their proposals, Local
Authorities were expected to provide evidence of the level of deprivation
in their area and the gaps in local provision of public services supporting
business (HM Treasury, 2006). 279 million pounds of funding covering
three years was allocated in the first two competitive bidding rounds held
3 For analysis of general equilibrium and spillover effects in the context of
other policy interventions, see e.g. Blundell et al. (2004), Bloom et al. (2013),
Crepon et al. (2013), and Dechezlepre^tre et al. (2016).
4 Busso et al. (2013) also estimate that the deadweight losses are modest.
5 At the time, the NRF was the major funding stream used to try to tackle
deprivation in England’s poorest neighborhoods. In contrast to LEGI, with its
clear economic focus, NRF had much wider objectives with about 20% of
expenditure targeted at crime, 20% on education (school and pre-school pro-
vision), 13% on employment, 15% on health, 7% on housing and physical
environment and 7% on transport (with the remainder spent on miscellaneous
other local priorities and administration).
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in February and December 2006 with funding awarded to 20 areas
comprising 30 Local Authorities displayed in appendix fig. B1 (some
areas involved joint bids with the largest awarded joint initiative con-
sisting of five Local Authorities) (DCLG, 2010a).
In some supported Local Authorities, support was further targeted to
specific areas. While we have some self-reported information on this
targeting (e.g. the poorest 10% of areas in Doncaster) we have no in-
formation on what factors drove it.6 Nor do we know if LEGI funding
relaxed budget constraints for supported Local Authorities, so that they
could re-direct other funds to support non-targeted areas. Following
Kline and Moretti (2014b), we focus on identifying the effects of the
programme across all areas within supported Local Authorities, rather
than on the set of targeted areas, to allow for endogenous policy response
within the wider supported area. This allows us to identify the effects of
LEGI funding on supported Local Authorities accounting for the poten-
tially endogenous response of other local policies. This approach is
further motivated by the fact that outside supported Local Authorities, no
areas are targeted. Therefore, dropping untargeted areas in supported
Local Authorities may cause selection bias because targeting was likely
partly driven by unobserved characteristics.7
Projects under the scheme were expected to operate with a ten-year
time horizon. In the end, the programme ran for six years with the
initiative abolished from March 2011 following a change of government.
By the abolition of the programme, the total spending on assistance had
reached around £418 ($717) million. Spending was at its highest level in
2008 and 2009 with around £100 ($171) million spent annually. With
resident working age populations of around 1.4 million, 234,000 un-
employed, and 85,000 businesses in 2006, per year allocation of funding
was around £71 ($122) per capita, £427 ($732) per unemployed, and
£1176 ($2016) per business in these years.8 The magnitude of LEGI
support is comparable to Federal expenditures on U.S. Enterprise Zones
(annually around $142 per capita (Busso et al., 2013)), and it is slightly
smaller than expenditures in the German Zonenrandgebiet scheme and in
areas receiving the highest EU Structural Funds support (annually around
194–373 and 230 euros per capita, respectively (Becker et al., 2010;
Ehrlich and Seidel, 2018)).
Due to the Local Authority specific design, the mix of support activ-
ities differed by area but the bulk of programme funding was targeted to
local business. Across the programme about 60% of expenditure went on
supporting existing and new local business (appendix fig. B2). Major
support activities were business advice and direct financial support
(grants and loans) which, according to a survey of beneficiary companies,
was received by nearly all of them (DCLG, 2010b). Other, less extensive
forms of business support included mentoring, coaching, workshops, and
training. A very small fraction of companies (less than 3%) reported
premises support.
The programme targeted local businesses and according to benefi-
ciary data, around 80% of business support was allocated to the local
service sector. Manufacturing and construction received 5.5 and 11.6%
of support among start-ups and 10.5 and 8.3% among existing businesses,
respectively. The recipient population covered a relatively high share of
groups that are typically not reached by other business programmes – for
example, around 34% of supported star-ups were by women and 32% by
individuals from an ethnic minority (DCLG, 2010a).
3. Data
Our units of observation are small geographical areas used as the basis
for the UK census. The UK Office for National Statistics calls these areas
“Lower Layer Super Output Areas” (LSOA), but we refer to these as
“micro-areas” hereafter.9 Geocoding of micro-areas by treatment status is
based on shape files provided by the UK Borders database. As discussed
above, an area is considered as treated if it is located within the
boundaries of a Local Authority receiving LEGI funding. Because micro-
areas are constructed so as not to cross any Local Authority boundaries,
the geocoding is exact.
Our three outcomes of interest – employment, number of businesses,
and unemployment – correspond closely to the objectives of LEGI. Data
on employment and number of business come from the Business Struc-
ture Database (ONS, 2019) which provides an annual snapshot of the
Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR). This dataset contains in-
formation on 2.1 million businesses, accounting for approximately 99%
of economic activity in the UK and includes each business’ name, post-
code, and total employment. We use the Ordnance Survey Code-Point
data set to match business postcodes to micro-areas and then construct
our measures of employment and number of businesses by aggregating
the BSD data by micro-area. One concern with using this source of data is
that it does not include new businesses that are below the VAT threshold
and do not voluntarily register. However, a large share of active com-
panies below the VAT threshold do register voluntarily because that al-
lows them to claim back the tax that they have paid on taxable supplies.10
Hence, the data constructed from the IDBR can be expected to have a very
good coverage of local employment, but may miss some of smallest
companies with activity levels low enough not to benefit from VAT
reimbursements.
Unemployment data measures the number of benefit claimants aged
16–64 and is available at micro-area level from the Neighborhood Sta-
tistics database maintained by the ONS.11 This data has otherwise full
coverage of claimants, with the exception that the ONS does not disclose
information for micro-areas with less than five claimants. However, there
are few such cases among micro-areas relevant for our analysis; infor-
mation on unemployment is available for 99% of them.12 We also have
data for area characteristics measuring acreage, measures of deprivation
and economic activity, and ethnic composition of residents by micro-area
provided by Neighborhood Statistics.
6 Based on self-reported information by programme managers, Local Au-
thorities that had no specific targeting account for around 60% of the total
number of spatial units in supported areas in our data.
7 For instance, supported Local Authorities may have targeted areas that could
be expected to benefit the most from the support. We provide a detailed dis-
cussion of the identifying assumptions of our difference-in-difference and
regression discontinuity approaches below.
8 Spending per supported individual and business were substantially higher,
but exact data are unavailable. The figures exclude increases in private outside
funding due to the programme support, which can be substantial (see, e.g.,
Busso et al., 2013).
9 The Local Super Output Areas (‘micro-areas’) have a minimum population of
1000. The 32,482 areas in England were built from groups of “Output Areas”
(OA) (typically 4 to 6) and constrained by the boundaries of the Standard
Table wards used for 2001 Census outputs. 2001 Census OAs were built from
clusters of adjacent unit postcodes. They were designed to have similar popu-
lation sizes and be as socially homogenous as possible (based on tenure of
household and dwelling type). OAs preferably consisted entirely of urban
postcodes or entirely of rural postcodes. They had approximately regular shapes
and tended to be constrained by obvious boundaries such as major roads. The
minimum OA size is 40 resident households and 100 resident persons but the
recommended size was rather larger at 125 households (http://www.ons.gov.u
k/about-statistics/geography/products/geog-products-area/names-codes/soa/i
ndex.html and http://www.statistics.gov.uk/geography/census_geog.asp,
accessed 27/06/2011).
10 See, e.g., “The Administrative Costs of Tax Compliance 2004” by the House of
Commons Treasury Committee.
11 www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk. Unemployment is measured as the
count of Job Seeker Allowance claimants within a micro-area. To get Job-
seeker’s Allowance a job seeker must be available for, capable of and actively
seeking work, aged 18 or over (except in some special cases) but below State
Pension age, working less than 16 h per week on average, and living in Great
Britain.
12 Because our analysis focuses on disadvantaged areas with relatively high
unemployment rates, the micro-areas relevant for us (that is, LEGI areas and 10
km control buffers around them) have better coverage of unemployment than
the full sample, in which it is around 97%.
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We evaluate the impact of LEGI using data for the period 2001–2012
covering four years before, and eight years after, the announcement of
the programme in 2005. We use the first pre-announcement year 2004 as
the baseline year. The first funding allocations were made in 2006 and
the programme ran until March 2011. The data window allows us to
examine potential pre-treatment trends prior to the announcement,
treatment effects in the programme period, and whether effects persist
once the programme ends. Descriptive statistics for the data are pre-
sented in Table 1 and appendix table B1. The way in which these statistics
are presented relates to our empirical strategies and so we postpone
further discussion of these tables until we have outlined the details of our
approach.
4. Empirical strategy and identification
In this section, we explain our empirical strategies for identifying the
causal effects of LEGI funding on economic outcomes. In programme
evaluation analysis, a common identifying assumption is that, in the
absence of the programme, outcomes are, on average, identical for
observably similar treated and untreated units (this is the conditional
independence assumption or CIA). A second key identifying assumption
is that the treatment does not affect outcomes of control units (this is the
stable unit treatment value assumption or SUTVA). If these assumptions
hold, average outcomes for untreated areas conditional on observable
characteristics would provide an unbiased estimate of what would have
happened to a treated unit in the absence of support and we could
identify the treatment effect by estimating the following equation:
Δyit ¼αþ γLrðiÞ þ βXi þ εit (1)
where Δyit ¼ yit  yi;2004 is a log change in the outcome of interest be-
tween the baseline year 2004 and year t in micro-area i; LrðiÞ is a binary
indicator for LEGI, equal to one if the micro-area is within a Local Au-
thority r, which was awarded LEGI funding, and zero otherwise; and Xi
are observable pre-treatment area characteristics.
Equation (1) compares changes in the outcome between all treated
and all untreated areas. A potential concern with this approach is that, to
the extent that treatment is not assigned randomly (as is the case with
LEGI), unobserved factors affecting the outcome may vary across treated
and untreated locations, and this would invalidate the CIA. This concern
has led many scholars to use nearby untreated locations as a control
group (e.g. Neumark and Kolko, 2010). This approach is based on the
idea that if unobserved characteristics vary smoothly across space, the
CIA is more likely to hold the smaller is the distance between treated and
untreated locations (Duranton et al., 2011). A standard way to implement
this idea empirically would be to introduce fixed effects for some
appropriate set of spatial units that represented clusters of the treated and
nearby untreated micro-areas, such as an area comprising the treatment
area and a control buffer around it:
Δyit ¼αl þ γLrðiÞ þ βXi þ εit (2)
where Δyit and LrðiÞ are as before and αl are fixed effects for the clusters.
While the introduction of area fixed effects may help with the CIA it
may introduce problems if nearby control areas are affected by treatment
as a result of general equilibrium effects within local markets (i.e. if
SUTVA is violated). For this reason, some previous studies estimating
direct treatment effects have excluded nearest control areas to avoid
biases arising from spillovers (e.g., Neumark and Kolko, 2010; Kline and
Moretti, 2014b). For example, if businesses located in the control buffer
compete with businesses located in the treatment area, the control area
outcomes are likely to be affected by the treatment. The extent of such
spillovers is important to understand for two reasons. First, if they are
non-negligible, using nearby areas as a control group will provide biased
estimates of treatment effects. Second, if treatment adversely affects
nearby untreated locations through negative market spillovers, this may
offset potential beneficial effects in the treatment area, reducing or
eliminating net effects in the aggregate. In the worst case, net aggregate
effects can even be negative if negative spillovers to nearby control areas
offset benefits in the treatment areas and, for example, commuting costs
increase or aggregate productivity declines.
4.1. Estimation of local displacement effects
Our test of displacement effects is based on difference-in-difference
estimation testing for violations of SUTVA by using micro-areas that
are further from the boundary, but still close enough to credibly satisfy
the CIA, as a counterfactual. We divide treatment and control areas in to
rings based on distance to the treatment area boundary. That is, we
augment equation (2) with dummy variables for control and treatment
rings that run parallel to the LEGI boundary (i.e. the boundary of the
Local Authorities receiving support from the LEGI programme):
Δyit ¼αl þ
X6
k¼1
θkT
k
i þ
X10
h¼1
ξhC
h
i þ βXi þ uit (3)
where Δyit and Xi are as before; the C
h
i are a set of ten one-km-wide
control ring dummies that take value one if a control micro-area i is be-
tween h 1 and h kilometers of the treatment area boundary, and zero
otherwise; and Tki are a set of six treatment ring dummies.
13 Treatment
rings are constructed symmetrically for treatment micro-areas, although
we pool all micro-areas that are further than 5 km from the nearest
control micro-area because the number of observations quickly decreases
whenmoving towards the centre of a LEGI area. More specifically, for k 2
f1;…;5g, Tki take value one if the distance from a treatment micro-area i
to the nearest control micro-area is between k 1 and k kilometers, while
T6i takes value one if the distance is more than 5 km, and zero otherwise.
We define area fixed effects, αl , at the level we call LEGI neighborhoods. A
LEGI neighborhood comprises a treatment area and a 10 km-wide buffer
area around it. Including αl in the estimating equation means that ring
indicators identify the spatial pattern of the changes in the outcome of
interest within LEGI neighborhoods. Finally, although treatment status is
invariant within Local Authorities outside LEGI neighborhoods, and we
do not assign micro-areas within them to 1-km rings, we include obser-
vations and fixed effects for them to allow comparability across specifi-
cations and to improve the precision of the estimated coefficients on pre-
treatment controls.14
Fig. 1 shows 1 km-wide treatment and control rings for the Croydon
and Barking & Dagenham LEGI areas in London. The smallest spatial
units in the figure are the micro-areas. Estimation based on equation (1),
excluding the LEGI neighborhood dummies, compares average perfor-
mance of LEGI micro-areas to that of all untreated micro-areas, while
estimation of equation (2) including fixed effects compares average
performance of treated and untreated micro-areas within LEGI neigh-
borhoods. Our test of displacement based on equation (3) compares
average performance of the nearest control rings to that of the control
rings further away from the treatment area boundary and to that of the
treatment rings, within a given LEGI neighborhood. The difference in the
average (conditional) growth rate for the outcome of interest between
treatment ring k and control ring h is θk  ξh in equation (3). This
13 Technically we use the distance from a control (treatment) micro-area
centroid to the nearest treatment (control) micro-area centroid to assign them
to control (treatment) rings. In contrast to defining the distance based on the
LEGI boundary line, this has the advantage of ensuring that the average distance
between locations in, say, a treated micro-area in the 1 km treatment ring and an
untreated micro-area in the 1 km control ring is approximately 1 km. Gibbons
et al. (2011) use a related approach to study the impact of government subsi-
dized improvements to commercial building supply.
14 We also present results for FE specifications excluding continuous control
variables.
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difference identifies the treatment effect if both CIA and SUTVA hold for
the ring pair. As discussed above, if unobserved characteristics vary
smoothly across space, the CIA will be more likely to hold the smaller is
hþ k. However, spillovers in local markets are likely to increase as hþ k
decreases. This implies that while comparisons between ring pairs are
likely to be the least confounded by unobserved characteristics when h ¼
1 and k ¼ 1, spillover effects are likely to be the largest for such pairs.
We test for spillover effects by comparing changes in the boundary
control areas to changes in areas further away from the boundary. We
also employ a form of this test that is based on a null hypothesis of no
boundary effects. This test compares changes in the outcomes between
treatment and control areas at the boundary and between treatment and
control areas further away from the boundary. Formally, we test for two
null hypotheses: (1) ξ1 ¼ θ1 and (2) ξh ¼ θh for some h > 1. A rejection of
the former null hypothesis without rejecting the latter indicates bound-
ary spillover effects, which are negative when ξ1 < 0 < θ1 and positive
when θ1 < 0 < ξ1.
4.2. Regression discontinuity design based on the minimum IMD rank rule
Exploiting variation across administrative boundaries may raise the
concern that locations on different sides of the border, however closely
located to each other, are exposed to different local policies. For example,
if Local Authorities that submitted successful bids were more capable of
carrying out successful economic policies, economic performance in
treated areas may have been better even in the absence of LEGI. In this
case the CIA may not hold even for pairs of contiguous treatment and
control areas.
In order to lend further credibility to the causal interpretation of our
results, we estimate the effects with an RD design which is based on the
funding eligibility rule. According to the rule, a Local Authority was
eligible to apply for LEGI funding if it ranked among the 50 worst Local
Authorities against any of eleven indices of deprivation in 2000 or
Table 1
Descriptive statistics by 1 km-wide control and treatment rings.
Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Diff. t-stat
1 km Treatment Ring 1 km Control Ring
Employment, 2004 391.51 633.01 183 460.66 1080.92 189 69.148 0.62
Unemployment, 2004 29.67 16.47 183 28.44 21.15 189 1.233 0.44
Number of businesses, 2004 35.28 36.26 183 38.19 39.53 189 2.912 0.48
Employment Density, 2004 1045 1597 183 1017 1875 189 27.528 0.13
Unemployment Density, 2004 118.34 120.56 183 120.14 128.31 189 1.794 0.12
Business Density, 2004 113.00 136.65 183 107.81 101.95 189 5.195 0.39
Employment, log change 2001–2004 0.035 0.43 183 0.025 0.452 189 0.010 1.26
Unemployment, log change 2001–2004 0.014 0.296 182 0.014 0.399 185 0.028 1.14
Number of businesses, log change 2001–2004 0.009 0.242 183 0.023 0.213 189 0.014 0.65
Employment, log change 2004–2009 0.106 0.550 183 0.040 0.659 189 0.146 3.75
Unemployment, log change 2004–2009 0.519 0.314 182 0.505 0.401 188 0.014 0.32
Number of businesses, log change 2004–2009 0.042 0.289 183 0.021 0.263 189 0.021 0.71
Employment, log change 2004–2012 0.163 0.594 183 0.127 0.651 189 0.036 0.57
Unemployment, log change 2004–2012 0.650 0.340 183 0.624 0.416 189 0.026 0.43
Number of businesses, log change 2004–2012 0.230 0.398 183 0.187 0.339 189 0.043 1.08
2 km Treatment Ring 2 km Control Ring
Employment, 2004 671.54 2303.37 505 507.66 1031.02 510 163.884 1.43
Unemployment, 2004 28.14 18.91 505 27.64 19.96 510 0.501 0.36
Number of businesses, 2004 49.00 118.80 505 42.33 44.33 510 6.675 1.02
Employment Density, 2004 1092 2565 505 957 1804 510 134.450 0.49
Unemployment Density, 2004 91.07 106.44 505 105.92 130.01 510 14.849 1.15
Business Density, 2004 97.58 140.03 505 109.59 145.61 510 12.016 0.53
Employment, log change 2001–2004 0.063 0.417 505 0.026 0.441 510 0.037 1.94
Unemployment, log change 2001–2004 0.030 0.362 501 0.006 0.362 500 0.023 0.76
Number of businesses, log change 2001–2004 0.048 0.235 505 0.033 0.199 510 0.015 1.01
Employment, log change 2004–2009 0.015 0.464 505 0.055 0.454 510 0.040 1.10
Unemployment, log change 2004–2009 0.566 0.378 502 0.498 0.399 503 0.068 2.50
Number of businesses, log change 2004–2009 0.003 0.262 505 0.029 0.261 510 0.026 1.09
Employment, log change 2004–2012 0.070 0.519 505 0.090 0.547 510 0.020 0.57
Unemployment, log change 2004–2012 0.740 0.443 498 0.683 0.463 505 0.057 1.54
Number of businesses, log change 2004–2012 0.126 0.336 505 0.161 0.335 510 0.035 2.29
3 km Treatment Ring 3 km Control Ring
Employment, 2004 570.77 1570.50 596 519.68 912.41 638 51.088 0.52
Unemployment, 2004 27.56 21.26 596 26 16.8 638 1.563 0.77
Number of businesses, 2004 42.01 58.48 596 46.02 45.12 638 4.004 1.03
Employment Density, 2004 1149 3087 596 987 1567 638 161.780 1.00
Unemployment Density, 2004 87.42 99.18 596 100.78 125.52 638 13.367 0.81
Business Density, 2004 94.38 124.72 596 111.07 138.19 638 16.690 1.04
Employment, log change 2001–2004 0.089 0.398 596 0.044 0.402 638 0.045 1.29
Unemployment, log change 2001–2004 0.040 0.388 588 0.040 0.398 628 0.000 0.01
Number of businesses, log change 2001–2004 0.055 0.221 596 0.039 0.207 638 0.016 1.00
Employment, log change 2004–2009 0.040 0.470 596 0.032 0.54 638 0.008 0.59
Unemployment, log change 2004–2009 0.539 0.409 591 0.522 0.398 631 0.017 0.59
Number of businesses, log change 2004–2009 0.017 0.261 596 0.011 0.252 638 0.006 0.25
Employment, log change 2004–2012 0.076 0.599 596 0.091 0.594 638 0.015 0.36
Unemployment, log change 2004–2012 0.739 0.465 590 0.683 0.452 631 0.056 1.24
Number of businesses, log change 2004–2012 0.088 0.345 596 0.133 0.304 638 0.045 2.19
Notes: Data on employment and number of businesses come from the Business Structure Database provided by the Secure Data Archive at Essex. All other variables come
from the Neighborhood Statistics database provided by the ONS except acreage which is based on LSOA boundary files drawn from Edina’s UK BORDERS portal.
Variables are measured at the LSOA level. T-statistics are adjusted for clustering at the level of LEGI neighborhood.
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Fig. 1. 1 km-wide Control and Treatment Rings (Croydon and Barking & Dagenham). Notes: The figure depicts 1 km-wide control and treatment rings in the Croydon
and Barking and Dagenham areas. Labels indicate the ring. For example, the 1 km treatment ring is labelled “T1” and the 2 km control ring is labelled “C2”. Distances
based on micro-area centroids. For example, the centroid of a 1 km control (treatment) micro-area is within 0–1000m from the nearest treatment (control) micro-area
centroid on the other side of the boundary. GIS data from Edina’s UK BORDERS portal.
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2004.15 Formally, this rule can be written as:
ErðiÞ¼ IðRrðiÞ  50Þ
where RrðiÞ is Local Authority r’s minimum rank across the eleven
deprivation indices (five indices for the year 2000 and six for the year
2004) and ErðiÞ is a binary indicator taking the value of one if this mini-
mum rank is less than or equal to 50 which unambiguously determined
eligibility for LEGI funding. The RD design is fuzzy because not all Local
Authorities received funding on the eligible side of the threshold. Hence,
we estimate the effects by employing a fuzzy RD design (see e.g., Hahn
et al., 2001; Van Der Klaauw, 2002) where we use the threshold in-
dicators as an instrument for the treatment status in a Two-Stage Least
Squares (TSLS) procedure based on the following equations:
LrðiÞ¼α1þ ρErðiÞþ τ
’
1
R
P
rðiÞ þ v1it (4a)
Δyit ¼α2þ ~θLrðiÞþ τ
’
2
R
P
rðiÞ þ v2it (4b)
where RPrðiÞ is a vector of P polynomial terms of the minimum IMD rank.
We allow for different coefficients on the (first and second order) terms of
minimum IMD rank on each side of the eligibility threshold. Here ~θs is the
parameter of interest. The key identifying assumption underlying the RD
approach is that Local Authorities did not manipulate their minimum
deprivation ranking to receive LEGI funding. We believe that manipu-
lation was highly unlikely for several reasons. First, we can rule out direct
manipulation through false reporting because the deprivation ranks are
constructed by central government based on national statistics. Second,
the timing rules out any manipulation of underlying socio-economic
characteristics in response to the announcement of the rules for fund-
ing because the deprivation rule was based on data pre-dating the
announcement of the programme. Third, in the RD analysis below, we
can detect no abnormal bunching of observations below the deprivation
rank cut-off of 50. Moreover, the minimum IMD rank is based on eleven
indices with each, in turn, based on numerous pre-determined variables
and complicated formulas so that the outcome of any such manipulation
on own IMD score would have been highly uncertain. The final ranking of
a Local Authority also depends on the performance of other Local Au-
thorities which further decreases the ability to precisely manipulate one’s
own ranking. Therefore it is very unlikely that Local Authorities
manipulated own deprivation scores to affect LEGI funding and incon-
ceivable that they could affect their rankings.
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive analysis
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for outcomes for the three 1 km-
wide treatment and control rings nearest to the treatment boundary.16
We also show differences in means between treatment and control rings
and the corresponding t-statistics. 1 km control rings are, on average,
similar to the 1 km treatment rings in terms of employment, unemploy-
ment and number of businesses in 2004 (i.e. pre-announcement). The
same is true for changes in these three outcomes over the pre-treatment
period between 2001 and 2004. In contrast, the change in employment in
the programme period is statistically significantly different between
these rings. Over the period 2004–2009, on average, employment
increased in the 1 km treatment rings by around 10.6% and decreased in
the 1 km control rings by around 4%. Differences in 2004–2009 growth
rates of unemployment and number of businesses across 1 km control and
treatment rings are smaller and statistically insignificant. Between 2004
and 2012 (i.e. from pre-programme till after the programme was abol-
ished) the differences between 1 km control and treatment rings are
insignificant for all outcomes.
Looking at the 2 km and 3 km treatment and control rings, we find no
statistically significant differences in most of the pre-programme out-
comes either in levels (2004) or changes (2001–2004).17 Looking across
all three outcomes we see three significant differences in the post-
treatment period18 all of which suggest poorer outcomes in the 2 km
and 3 km treatment rings.
We do not spend more time on these differences as the mean com-
parisons in Table 1 do not account for unobserved differences in trends
across LEGI neighborhoods and for the potential confounding selection of
Local Authorities to the programme. We now turn to our econometric
analysis that is more robust against these potential sources of bias.
5.2. Difference-in-difference estimates
We start by displaying results for pooled and area fixed-effects re-
gressions without ring dummies. In all difference-in-difference estima-
tions, we cluster standard errors by LEGI neighborhoods and by Local
Authority for micro-areas not in a LEGI neighborhood. Table 2 displays
the results for pre-trends between 2001 and 2004, treatment effects for
changes between 2004 and 2009, and long-term effects for changes be-
tween 2004 and 2012. In column 1, the naïve estimate is insignificant
across all outcomes except for the 2001–2004 and 2004–2012 change in
unemployment. When conditioning on 10 km neighborhood fixed effects
(column 2) and adding census controls for area characteristics (column
3), all coefficients become insignificant. The coefficient (standard error)
for the 2004–2009 log-change in employment in column 3 is 0.020
(0.022). This point estimate recovers the impact of the programme over
the announcement year and four programme years and corresponds to
only around a 0.4 percentage point annual increase in the growth rate of
employment. Similarly, the standard error for the annualized estimate
corresponds to around 0.44 percentage points. The precision of our
estimation is therefore sufficient to reject the null hypothesis of no im-
pacts on the annual growth rate of employment for estimates above
around 0.86 percentage points at the 95% confidence level.
While the standard difference-in-difference analysis does not detect
statistically significant differences between treatment and control areas,
the analysis comparing all treated and all control areas may hide treat-
ment effects at a finer spatial scale. To examine this, we estimate re-
gressions corresponding to equation (3), including dummies for ten
control and six treatment rings and controlling for LEGI neighborhood
fixed effects and census control variables.
Fig. 2 shows placebo and treatment effect estimates of the impacts of
LEGI funding across rings using log-changes between 2001 and 2004 and
between 2004 and 2009.19 The figure displays the estimates and 95%
confidence intervals for the ring dummies using the 2 km control ring as
the reference category.
Starting with employment, we detect no statistically significant dif-
ferences in pre-trends between the 2 km control ring and any other ring
within 10 kms of the boundary. When comparing the 1 km control ring to
15 For data and methodology for calculating Local Authority-level IMD rank-
ings see Appendix B.
16 Appendix table B1 presents summary statistics for all treated and all control
micro areas.
17 The only exception is the growth rate of employment between the 2 km
rings. The difference becomes statistically insignificant, however, when we
control for area fixed effects and pre-programme characteristics below.
18 For the 2 km rings we find significant differences for unemployment
2004–2009 and number of businesses 2004–2012, for the 3 km rings for number
of businesses 2004–2012.
19 The choice of the period 2004–2009 is motivated by the fact that pro-
gramme funding was at its highest levels in 2008 and 2009. Using alternative
treatment years does not affect our conclusions (estimates for alternative
treatment years are available in appendix table B2). Our analysis includes 247
clusters of which 20 are treatment clusters. Hence cluster-robust regression
standard errors can be expected to perform well in our setting.
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other rings, the pattern of estimates suggests that 2001–2004 employ-
ment growth was worse in the 1 km treatment ring compared to the 1 km
control ring. In a regression using the 1 km control ring as the reference
category, the coefficient on the 1 km treatment ring dummy is 0.058
with a standard error of 0.029 and it is statistically significant at the 5%
risk level (appendix table A1). If this difference persisted, it would work
against finding negative displacement effects in the 1 km control ring.
However, for the period 2002–2004, the difference in employment
growth between the 1 km treatment and control rings is only 0.001
with a standard error of 0.036, suggesting that the difference was not
persistent.20
The pattern of estimates for the period 2004-09 indicates that the
programme induced marked divergence of employment at the treatment
area boundary. This displacement effect is also highly persistent across
treatment years (see appendix table B2). We detect large relative
employment losses in the 1 km control ring compared to other control
rings. Between 2004 and 2009, employment dropped around 10.3% in
the 1 km control ring when compared to the 2 km control ring. This
corresponds to around a 2.1 percentage point annual deviation in the
growth rate of employment. This economically and statistically signifi-
cant negative effect, together with the insignificant estimates across a
wide range of control rings further from the boundary suggests that the
programme induced substantial displacement of employment from un-
treated micro-areas just outside the LEGI boundary. In the treatment
area, we detect the largest positive estimates for the 1 km treated ring
and the largest divergence in employment occurs between the 1 km
treated and 1 km control rings. The difference in employment growth
between these two boundary rings is around 15 percentage points and
statistically significant at the 5% level.
The results for the number of business units provide little evidence of
pre-trends or displacement in terms of the number of business units. For
instance, the difference between the 2 km and 1 km control rings is only
0.015 log-points with a standard error of 0.018 in the period 2004-09.
For 2001-04 changes in unemployment, the estimates for the 3 km
treatment ring and 3 km and 9 km control rings are statistically signifi-
cant at the 5% level while the estimates for other rings are not significant.
However, all coefficients on ring dummies are insignificant when we use
midpoint %-changes as the outcome to account for censoring and zero
values in the unemployment data (appendix fig. A1). For 2004-09 change
in unemployment, only the estimate for 1 km control ring is significant at
the 10% confidence level. We detect no statistically significant differ-
ences between the 1 km treatment and control rings at the boundary, and
therefore cannot reject the hypothesis of no displacement for unem-
ployment (appendix table A2, column 5). Overall, we find little evidence
of displacement for unemployment either before the programme or in the
programme period.
Previous studies have found that targeted economic development
policies can benefit some industries and hurt others.21 Because the LEGI
programme targeted local markets and, in particular, local services, these
industries could be expected to be most affected. To examine this, we
estimated the main specifications for 2004–2009 log-changes in
employment and number of businesses for service industries. These in-
dustries cover 65.9% of employment in our data in 2004.22 We find a
very similar and statistically significant employment displacement
pattern for these industries (see appendix fig. A2).
Fig. 3 examines the persistence of the effects on employment after the
programme was abolished in March 2011, using log-changes between
2004 and 2012 as the outcome. We are unable to detect statistically
significant displacement of employment over this longer period, sug-
gesting that the effects vanished quickly after the programme ended.23
Overall, these findings indicate that LEGI funding resulted in the
displacement of employment from untreated to treated areas. The pattern
of point estimates also suggests that the displacement seems to be
stronger the closer an untreated area is to the border of a treatment area.
Furthermore, we detect no impact on the number of businesses. This
finding suggests that the displacement effect we identify for employment
is created in existing rather than new firms. This is consistent with the
fact that, in the UK, commercial rental contracts typically cover a five-
year fixed term which implies sticky price adjustment and incomplete
capitalization in the short-run for incumbent businesses (Crosby et al.,
2003; Duranton et al., 2011). As a result, an economic intervention
supporting local businesses need not generate higher entry rates as
Table 2
Difference-in-difference estimates without ring dummies.
(1) Pooled
OLS
(2) Area
FE
(3) Area FE þ control
variables
A. Employment, log change 2001–04
LEGI 0.002 0.013 0.003
(0.024) (0.025) (0.019)
N 32473 32473 32473
B. Employment, log change 2004–09
LEGI 0.001 0.007 0.020
(0.013) (0.018) (0.022)
N 32473 32473 32473
C. Employment, log change 2004–12
LEGI 0.017 0.006 0.019
(0.017) (0.021) (0.025)
N 32474 32474 32474
D. Number of Businesses, log change 2001–04
LEGI 0.007 0.013* 0.012
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011)
N 32473 32473 32473
E. Number of Businesses, log change 2004–09
LEGI 0.003 0.005 0.008
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012)
N 32473 32473 32473
F. Number of Businesses, log change 2004–12
LEGI 0.013 0.015 0.007
(0.013) (0.016) (0.018)
N 32474 32474 32474
G. Unemployment, log change 2001–04
LEGI 0.051** 0.019 0.009
(0.026) (0.022) (0.023)
N 31135 31135 31135
H. Unemployment, log change 2004–09
LEGI 0.010 0.040 0.021
(0.033) (0.041) (0.048)
N 31472 31472 31472
I. Unemployment, log change 2004–12
LEGI 0.101*** 0.028 0.016
(0.038) (0.042) (0.051)
N 31380 31380 31380
10 km LEGI Neighborhood
Fixed Effects
Yes Yes
Pre-determined Area
Characteristics
Yes
Note: Panel labels refer to the outcome. Pre-determined area characteristics are
the log of micro-area acreage, minimum IMD rank, and variables listed under the
labels “population characteristics” in table B1. Data on employment and number
of business come from the Business Structure Database provided by the Secure
Data Archive at Essex; All other variables come from the Neighborhood Statistics
database provided by the ONS except acreage which is based on LSOA boundary
files drawn from Edina’s UK BORDERS portal. Standard errors are clustered by
LEGI neighborhoods and by Local Authority for micro-areas not in a LEGI
neighborhood. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence
levels, respectively.
20 Moreover, we find no evidence of different pre-treatment trends in our
regression discontinuity design.
21 See e.g. Hanson and Rohlin (2011), Freedman (2015), Patrick (2016),
Harger and Ross (2016), and Patrick et al. (2017).
22 We exclude the education sector and public administration as these were not
targeted by the programme.
23 We also found no evidence of displacement in terms of number of businesses
or unemployment in the long-term (appendix table A3).
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businesses entering the local market must sign new contracts with rental
rates potentially inflated by the intervention.24 On the other hand, at
boundary areas, funding may help supported incumbent firms to win a
larger share of local markets from incumbent unsupported firms.25
Fig. 2. Effect of LEGI by 1 km-Wide Treatment and Control Rings, Placebo and Treatment Effect Estimates. Notes: Difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of
LEGI for 1 km-wide control and treatment rings. Specification controls for 10 km LEGI neighborhood fixed effects and pre-determined characteristics, which are the log
of micro-area acreage, minimum IMD rank, and variables listed under the label “population characteristics” in table B1. The gray capped lines display the 95%
confidence intervals, based on standard errors clustered by LEGI neighborhoods and by Local Authority for micro-areas not in a LEGI neighborhood. The reference
category is the 2 km control ring. Corresponding estimates and standard errors are reported in appendix tables A1 and A2.
24 The effects of spatially targeted support may be offset if rents are flexible
and support is fully capitalized (e.g. Muth, 1969; Roback, 1982). However, both
the long contract periods and the finding of strong displacement of employment
suggest that rents are not completely elastic.
25 The point estimate for employment in the 1 km treatment ring can be
different to the point estimate for the 1 km control ring if, for instance, sup-
ported incumbents that increase market share increase hours of employment
while unsupported firms reduce number of jobs.
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Weaker effects on unemployment, which is based on the residential
rather thanwork location of a worker, is easy to reconcile with significant
employment displacement: it is consistent with the idea that local labor
markets cross programme boundaries and with previous evidence indi-
cating that jobs generated by area-based interventions are often taken by
individuals who reside outside the treatment area (e.g., Busso et al.,
2013; Freedman, 2015). The results also suggest that the spatial scope of
job displacement is too narrow to generate any statistically detectable
differences in employment trends at a more aggregate level.26 Finally, the
finding that the effects on employment do not persist long beyond the
abolition of the programme in March 2011 suggests that the programme
appears to have created temporary employment displacement around the
boundary of the treated Local Authorities, but have induced no long-run
divergence in employment growth.
5.3. RD results
The variation exploited to estimate differences between treatment
and control rings comes from between Local Authority differences in
programme funding. Although our difference-in-difference approach
compares rings within a relatively small area, the control and treatment
rings are administrated by different Local Authorities which may raise
the concern that areas which won a bid for LEGI funding may have been
successful in attracting funding for other local development projects as
well, or that they may have been more efficient in administrating their
area in general. If this was the case, comparisons across the Local Au-
thority boundary may be confounded.
We address the potential concern that more efficient Local Authorities
received treatment with the fuzzy RD approach described in section 4.
Because the estimates in Fig. 2 suggest very local displacement of
employment within 1 km of the treatment area boundary, we test for this
pattern in the RD design for two samples: (i) a boundary sample con-
taining micro-areas within the 1 km treatment and control rings and (ii) a
sample containing micro-areas within 2–3 km treatment and control
rings. The choice of rings is motivated by the findings in Fig. 2, which
suggest that the displacement of employment occurs only within 1 km of
the boundary. We limit the samples to 3 km treatment and control rings,
which are close enough to the boundary to plausibly satisfy the CIA
assumption. An advantage of restricting estimation to subsamples is that
we can estimate differential impacts of the programme within these
samples between control and treatment micro-areas with a just-identified
single-instrument IV procedure.27Our baseline specification uses a linear
function of the minimum IMD rank allowing for different coefficients
across the threshold.28 Standard errors are clustered by minimum IMD
rank in all RD specifications (see, e.g., Lee and Card, 2008).29 We also
show that our results are robust when we add a second-order polynomial
of the minimum IMD rank, use a weighting kernel, and restrict the
sample to minimum IMD rank range of 10–100, which is the optimal CCT
bandwidth.30 We detect no abnormal bunching to the left of the
threshold (appendix fig. B3).31 This is expected, because manipulation of
minimum IMD rank is very unlikely due to its complex determination and
because it is pre-determined, as discussed in section 4.2. We provide
results for RD specifications testing for pre-trends in appendix table B3.
We detect no pre-trends on any of the outcomes in subsamples including
micro-areas within 1 km rings, 2–3 km rings, and 10 km LEGI
neighborhoods.
We start with baseline RD estimates of the impact of the programme
on employment growth between 2004 and 2009 for 1 km rings. The first-
stage and IV estimates and standard errors are reported in the first col-
umn of panel A in Table 3 while the corresponding first-stage and
reduced-form RD plots are displayed in Figs. 4 and 5. Fig. 4 shows a sharp
first-stage discontinuity on LEGI treatment. The estimate of the size of
this discontinuity and its standard error are shown in the second row of
column 1 in Table 3. The point estimate is 1.148, and significant at the
1% level, indicating that the eligibility rule provides strong first-stage
variation in treatment status.32 The reduced-form RD plot for this spec-
ification is shown in Fig. 5. The graph shows that the micro-areas on the
eligible side of the eligibility threshold experience higher employment
growth between the years 2004 and 2009; the point estimate of the size
of this discontinuity is 0.391. The corresponding IV estimate (standard
error) of the impact of the programme on the difference in the growth
rates between 1 km treatment and control rings is 0.341 (0.109) and
highly significant. The corresponding IV estimate for the 2–3 km
Fig. 3. Long-Term Effect of LEGI by 1 km-Wide Treatment and Control Rings.
Notes: Difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of LEGI for 1 km-wide
control and treatment rings. Specification controls for 10 km LEGI neighborhood
fixed effects and pre-determined characteristics, which are the log of micro-area
acreage, minimum IMD rank, and variables listed under the label “population
characteristics” in table B1. The gray capped lines display the 95% confidence
intervals, based on standard errors clustered by LEGI neighborhoods and by
Local Authority for micro-areas not in a LEGI neighborhood. The reference
category is the 2 km control ring. Corresponding estimates and standard errors
are reported in appendix table A3.
26 The 1 km treatment ring accounted for around 3.1% of total employment in
LEGI areas in 2004.
27 Alternatively, we could interact all right-hand-side variables with a sub-
sample dummy indicating each relevant ring pair. However, this would lead to
an over-identified IV model which may be susceptible to weak instrument bias.
We prefer the pairwise ring estimation because it uses only a single instrument
and allows for the graphical presentation of the RD results.
28 We prefer the first-order polynomial specification due to the concern that
the relatively small number of observations in some of our subsamples could
lead to problems related to over-fitting in RD settings (see Gelman and Imbens,
2019 for a thorough discussion of unreliability of RD estimates in over-fitted
settings).
29 Kolesar and Rothe (2018) suggest an alternative way to calculate confidence
intervals in sharp RD settings with a discrete running variable, but their method
is not applicable in our fuzzy RD setting.
30 The CCT bandwidth is calculated with the Stata rdrobust procedure (see
Calonico et al., 2014a, 2014b).
31 We tested the null hypothesis of no manipulation with the robust test of
Cattaneo et al. (2017). The p-value was 0.595, indicating no manipulation.
32 The estimate of the discontinuity on treatment status is slightly larger than
one, which may raise the concern that the first-order polynomial is not the
correct specification for the first-stage equation. However, because the IV esti-
mate of the treatment effect in the fuzzy RD model is equivalent to the ratio of
the reduced-form discontinuity estimate and the first-stage discontinuity esti-
mate, the potential over-estimation of the first-stage discontinuity due to mis-
specified first-stage equation provides conservative results. We also show
below that our results are robust when we allow for second order polynomials of
the minimum IMD rank, which provide first-stage estimates that are below one.
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treatment and control ring sample is small (0.016) and insignificant.
The IV estimate of the impact of the program on the employment
growth differential between the 1 km treatment and control rings from
the RD design is larger than the corresponding difference-in-difference
estimate (0.152, see column 1 of appendix table A2), although the
difference-in-difference estimate falls within the 95% confidence interval
of the RD estimate. These estimates do not necessarily recover the same
underlying parameter, because the RD design identifies the impacts for
the threshold population while the difference-in-difference analysis
identifies the effects for a wider population.33 Nevertheless, the RD es-
timates in columns 1 and 2 of panel A provide additional support, with
stronger internal validity, for the displacement effects detected by the
difference-in-difference analysis above.34
We also estimated specifications using the 2 km control ring as the
reference category and separately for each 1 km-wide treatment ring as
the comparison group (appendix table B5, panel A). The results from
these specifications indicated a similar displacement pattern for
employment as the other estimation approaches.35
The RD setting also allows identification of the causal impacts of the
programme for the whole treatment area. Column 3 of Table 3 does this
by providing RD estimates for a sample including all micro-areas within
10 km LEGI neighborhoods. In panel A, the IV estimate of the treatment
effect for employment is negative and insignificant and does not allow us
to reject the null hypothesis that the programme had no impact on overall
employment in LEGI areas.
Panels B and C of Table 3 provide RD estimates for number of busi-
nesses and unemployment. For neither outcome do we detect significant
divergence between the 1 km boundary rings due to the programme. For
number of businesses the estimate for the 2–3 km zone is 0.064, and
weakly significant. We also detect a small negative, but insignificant
estimate in column 3. These estimates suggest that the programme, if
anything, may have reduced the number of local businesses in the 2–3 km
treatment rings compared to the 2–3 km control rings.36 Finally, the RD
design detects no statistically significant impacts on unemployment.
In Table 4, we examine the robustness of the RD results for the
boundary and 2–3 km ring samples. Column 1 replicates the baseline
estimates in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3. Column 2 allows for a second
order polynomial of the minimum IMD rank. In panel A, this increases the
RD estimate of the impact of the programme on the employment growth
differential between the 1 km treatment and control rings to 0.625. In
column 3, we add a control variable for 2003 log-level of the outcome
(e.g., in panel A, the log of 2003 employment) to further test the validity
of the RD design. This approach is an alternative robustness check to
adding unit fixed effects, but is more efficient because it sacrifices fewer
degrees of freedom (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The IV estimate for
employment in panel A is very little affected by this alternative specifi-
cation. Column 4 is similar to column 3 but weights the regression with a
triangular weight equal to one at the cut-off and linearly declining to zero
towards the left and right tails of the minimum IMD range. This
weighting procedure has also very little impact on the estimate. Column
5 restricts the estimation to optimal CCT bandwidth (Calonico et al.,
2014a) of 10–100. This, again, has little impact on the point estimate,
which in this most demanding specification is 0.521. Combined with the
finding of no statistically significant differences in employment growth
between the 2–3 km treatment and control rings across specifications in
panel B, these results are in line with the significant displacement of
employment at the treatment area boundary.
Panels C and D report the robustness results for number of businesses.
In panel C, which displays estimates for the boundary rings, we report
one marginally significant estimate in column 3, which becomes insig-
nificant when we allow for kernel weights. For 2–3 km rings in panel D,
we report a marginally significant negative coefficient in columns 1–3.
This coefficient increases and becomes significant at the 5% level in
columns 4 and 5. These findings strengthen the conclusion that the
number of businesses may have declined within these rings in the
treatment area. The impacts of the programme on number of businesses
could well be negative in some parts of the treatment area if, for instance,
a larger fraction of support goes to companies that are not the smallest in
the local economy, and rivalry effects force a non-negligible fraction of
small companies to exit. For this reason, we consider the results for
employment of first order importance when assessing the impacts of the
policy. Finally, the estimates for unemployment are all insignificant
(panels E and F), which is in line with the corresponding difference-in-
difference results. Overall, the regression discontinuity analysis pro-
vides robust additional evidence, based on weaker identifying assump-
tions, of the displacement effects on employment in areas close to the
treatment area boundary.
6. Summary and conclusions
Improving the economic and social conditions in deprived neigh-
borhoods is a central urban policy objective in many countries. This
paper evaluates the impacts of a large-scale area-based intervention that
Table 3
Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates.
(1) 1 km rings (2) 2–3 km rings (3) 10 km LEGI Neighborhood
A. Employment, log change 2004–09
LEGI 0.341*** 0.016 0.051
(0.109) (0.040) (0.053)
1st stage
IðR 50Þ 1.148*** 0.881*** 0.607**
(0.142) (0.227) (0.278)
Observations 372 2249 10317
B. Number of Businesses, log change 2004–09
LEGI 0.041 0.064* 0.027
(0.034) (0.036) (0.037)
1st stage
IðR 50Þ 1.148*** 0.881*** 0.607**
(0.142) (0.227) (0.278)
Observations 372 2249 10317
C. Unemployment, log change 2004–09
LEGI 0.015 0.054 0.042
(0.096) (0.128) (0.155)
1st stage
IðR 50Þ 1.146*** 0.881*** 0.609**
(0.142) (0.227) (0.277)
Observations 370 2227 10182
Notes: Fuzzy RD estimates using an indicator for observations left to the mini-
mum IMD rank cut-off of 50 as an instrument for the LEGI area dummy. All
specifications use first order polynomial of the minimum rank variable allowing
for different coefficients across the cut-off. The dependent variables are indicated
by the panel labels. Estimates in columns 1, 2, and 3 are based on a sample of
treatment and control micro-areas located within 0–1000m, 1000–3000m, and
10,000m from the treatment area boundary. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered by minimum IMD rank. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and
1% confidence levels, respectively.
33 The larger RD point estimate could arise, for instance, from heterogeneous
treatment effects with larger impacts among the least deprived eligible areas
that are closer to the eligibility cut-off.
34 We also found no evidence of the displacement effects for employment
persisting in the long-term. The IV estimates (standard errors) for baseline RD
model using log-changes in employment between 2004 and 2012 as the
outcome are 0.059 (0.108) for micro-areas within 1 km rings and 0.053
(0.077) for micro-areas within 2–3 km rings.
35 We also do not detect any statistically significant pre-treatment trends for
these specifications (appendix table B6).
36 The estimates by 1 km-wide treatment rings with 2 km control ring as the
reference category lead to the same conclusion, with IV coefficients for some
treatment ring dummies being negative and statistically significant (see ap-
pendix table B5, panel B).
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aimed to improve employment and entrepreneurial activity in the most
deprived areas of the UK by providing targeted support to businesses in
the local non-tradable sector. We assess the causal impacts of the policy
by combining spatial difference-in-difference and RD strategies based on
programme eligibility rule. We show that pre-policy outcomes are
balanced between treatment and control groups, there is no bunching at
the RD threshold, and that our results are robust to a battery of RD val-
idity checks.
While we find no effects on aggregate employment in treated areas,
data at fine spatial scale reveals significant displacement of employment
from unsupported to supported areas close to the treatment area
boundary. While the displacement pattern is persistent in the programme
period, it diminishes quickly after the programme is abolished. Our
finding of the unintended displacement of economic activity across the
boundary of treated areas is especially important because the negatively
affected nearby neighborhoods in our study are also, on average,
economically distressed. The results suggest that the programme may
have simply shuffled jobs from one deprived area to another with no
aggregate net effects.
Our results are consistent with the idea that the net impacts on
employment of area-based interventions may be attenuated by general
equilibrium effects. Although we are unable to identify general
Fig. 5. Reduced-Form Regression Discontinuity Plot for Employment, 1 km Rings. Notes: N ¼ 372. Outcome is the log-change in employment between 2004 and 2009.
Plots are means by minimum IMD rank bins. The number of observations within bin ranges from 13 to 33. See appendix B for the corresponding plots for micro-areas
within 2–3 km rings and 10 km LEGI neighborhoods.
Fig. 4. First-Stage Regression Discontinuity Plot, 1 km Rings. Notes: N ¼ 372. Outcome is the binary indicator for LEGI treatment. Plots are means by minimum IMD
rank bins. The number of observations within bin ranges from 13 to 33. See appendix B for the corresponding plots for micro-areas within 2–3 km rings and 10 km
LEGI neighborhoods.
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equilibrium effects at a wider spatial scale (e.g., national or global), our
study makes an important contribution by providing evidence that such
effects can occur within local markets. Our findings are consistent with
the view that supporting the non-tradable sector may be a highly inef-
ficient instrument for transferring jobs to disadvantaged areas.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi
.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2019.103500.
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